Risk Communication Capacity at Nigerian Points of Entry: A Comparative Assessment Against International Health Regulations (2005) Core-Capacity Requirements

Abstract

Background: Risk communication-the timely exchange of information between health authorities, operational stakeholders and the travelling public-is a core capacity under IHR (2005) and determines how quickly an emerging cross-border health threat can be contained at a Point of Entry (POE).

Objective: To assess and compare the functionality of risk communication channels, access to decision-makers, and communication linkages with competent authorities across Nigeria's busiest airport, seaport and land border.

Methods: A comparative cross-sectional study administered a structured questionnaire to 122 personnel (41 airport, 41 seaports, 40 land border), supplemented by focus group discussions and key informant interviews, at Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Apapa Seaport and the Seme land border between February and May 2017. Quantitative data were analysed descriptively; qualitative data thematically.

Results: A functional risk communication channel was reported by 46.3% of airport, 22.0% of seaport and 65.0% of land-border respondents. Access to decision-makers was reported by 63.4%, 17.1% and 42.5% respectively. Domestic communication links with competent authorities were reported by 63.4%, 39.0% and 75.0%, and international links by 36.6%, 12.2% and 77.5%, at the same three sites. Informal risk communication relied on personal mobile phones and WhatsApp rather than formal channels, with no mechanism at any site for disseminating WHO or neighbouring-country recommendations within 24 hours.

Conclusion: Risk communication capacity at Nigerian POEs is inconsistent and, at the seaport in particular, markedly inadequate, relying substantially on informal, personal channels rather than institutionalised systems. Investment in formal, IHR-compliant risk communication infrastructure-especially at Apapa Seaport-is needed to close this gap.